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Keep Calm and Teach Gaius 
Nicholas Kasirer 
INTRODUCTION 
Total information in the digital age gives a picture of law that is 
distressingly unruly, but this is decidedly not so for the civil law taught in 
the universities. For centuries, civilian categories of thought have neatly 
organized the law across continents in a seemingly straight line, and none 
of the vagaries of human experience seem to deflect it from a Cartesian 
path. Following in those tracks would be one way to teach the civil law 
while others lose their way in the darkness brought on by too much law. 
Today’s students can swap their anxieties and their search engines for a 
pocket civil code.1 As for faculty, they would do well to stick to the well-
trodden Professorenrecht. Keep calm and teach Gaius. 
Yet while the finest teachers recognize that a focus on timeless 
principles helps unclutter the mind, they are also wary of the pitfalls 
associated with essentialism in the civil law. It is indeed best to 
acknowledge the limits of any way of knowing the law that refuses to 
deviate from the narrow path of abstract rationality.2 Despite appearances, 
the civil law tradition has never walked an entirely straight line, 
consistently making room for local context and even bending substantially 
to accommodate one or another historical moment or curiosity.3 It has 
strayed far enough to include, as well, the occasional conceptual misfit on 
its otherwise rationalist way forward, including institutions and ideas that 
challenge the civil law’s mythical ambition to “remain a whole with its 
own cohesion, logic and requirements.”4 There are family heirlooms that 
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 * Justice of the Quebec Court of Appeal; former Dean of Law, McGill 
University. 
 1. By presenting Louisiana’s droit commun in a format stripped of 
distracting observations, case notes, and potted history, Alain A. Levasseur 
embraces some of this fine pedagogical ideal. See LOUISIANA POCKET CIVIL CODE 
(Alain A. Levasseur ed., 2014). 
 2. For an influential account of the sometimes uneasy relationship between 
method and history for the civil law in the French tradition, see Alain A. 
Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762 (1969). 
 3. A nuanced picture of the checkered development of this “explicit 
rationality in [civil] law” is found in H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF 
THE WORLD 146 (3d ed. 2007). 
 4. CHRISTIAN ATIAS, FRENCH CIVIL LAW: LE DROIT CIVIL 25 (Alain A. 
Levasseur trans., 2002). 
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upset the unity of succession: the jus ad rem trans personam that can give 
real trouble to a lessor, and the rarely trustworthy civilian “fiduciary 
obligation.” Other such annoyances include the liberty-threatening 
innominate personal servitude; the abandoned immovable (that perfect 
patrimonial orphan); the cemetery plot containing, or not, the remains of 
the dead; materialist ownership that somehow clings to immaterial sources 
of wealth; as well as the infans conceptus and civil death that confound, 
from start to finish, the law of persons.  
Epistemically speaking, these problem concepts are often depicted as 
exceptions that prove the very rules they might otherwise undermine or, 
more despairingly, as sui generis notions to be contained in order to 
preserve the rectitude of the general theory of private law.5 Only 
occasionally are they championed as opportunities to understand the civil 
law’s simultaneous penchant for order and tolerance of disorder. This 
Essay points to the virtue of teaching in a manner that freely acknowledges 
the occasionally meandering ways and means of the civil law as a modest 
tribute to the career of the professor celebrated in these pages. 
A striking feature of Louisiana Law of Obligations: A Methodological 
& Comparative Perspective,6 is the authors’ thought-provoking decision 
to begin the book with a protracted consideration of one of these civilian 
misfits, the “natural obligation.” One might have expected the atypical 
natural obligation to be banished to back pages or buried footnotes because 
it fails to line up with the primary definition of a civil obligation.7 Not so: 
the materials on this topic begin on page 5, after a modest two-page 
presentation of “Obligations: Principles.”8 The readings on natural 
                                                                                                             
 5. One author provides critical comments on what he characterizes as the 
“Handicap of French Legal Thinking” by reason of its formalism and its ties to a 
rigid theory of sources of law. See Christian Atias, American Legal Culture and 
Traditional Scholarly Order, 46 LA. L. REV. 1117, 1119–21 (Alain A. Levasseur 
ed., 1986). 
 6. ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, RANDALL TRAHAN & SANDI VARNADO, LOUISIANA 
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: A METHODOLOGICAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1–4 
(2013).  
 7. A leading French textbook on obligations begins its account of the natural 
obligation—on page 707 of an 856 page treatise—with a challenging opening 
sentence that refers back to the idea of the civil obligation considered in the 
preceding 706 pages: “The natural obligation is not truly obligatory; it 
nevertheless produces some of the effects of the civil obligation. To understand 
the notion and its rules of application, the natural obligation must be compared to 
the civil obligation, to which it stands in opposition.” PHILIPPE MALAURIE, 
LAURENT AYNÈS & PHILIPPE STOFFEL-MUNCK, LES OBLIGATIONS 707 (5th ed. 
2011) (Author’s translation).  
 8. LEVASSEUR ET AL., supra note 6, at 3–5. 
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obligations follow a classically civilian format commencing with the codal 
sources of private law, followed by doctrinal commentary, before turning 
to the decided cases relating to this profoundly jurisprudential topic.9 But 
why, in this superbly high-church setting, should teaching this basic course 
start with and linger upon the natural obligation? 
Even if the Louisiana Civil Code devotes a surprising amount of space 
to the topic when compared to other codes in the civil law tradition, the 
natural obligation does seem to be something of an awkward place to start 
the study of the vinculum juris.10 However juridical, the natural obligation 
cannot be enforced by action before the courts.11 If binding on the person 
who makes it, the natural obligation only holds the debtor to account, as 
the Louisiana Civil Code once made explicit, “in conscience and according 
to natural justice.”12 Yet at the same time, the natural obligation seems 
much more than a tug at conscience: performance of a natural obligation 
constitutes, as the civil law dictionaries remind us, payment in law.13 These 
apparently contradictory features show that if the natural obligation is not 
quite a civil obligation, neither is it merely a moral one. Beginning with 
                                                                                                             
 9. This ordering of the texts stands as a symbolic form for the classical 
methods of legal interpretation in a codified system, plainly the model for civil 
law teaching that this excellent book promotes. The resolutely civilian 
countenance of the materials—not a casebook—is to be applauded. The authors 
are allying themselves with the methods of interpretation that François Gény 
advanced, where the text of the Civil Code is understood as the non-exclusive 
center of the “freely scientific search for meaning.” See ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, 
DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE: SOURCES OF LAW AND METHODS OF 
INTERPRETATION 74 (2015). 
 10. Part of the explanation certainly rests in the considerable place that 
natural obligations take up in the present Louisiana Civil Code and its antecedents. 
See Shael Herman, The Uses of Analogia Iuris in the Louisiana Code of Practice 
(1825), 12.3 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1, 9–29 (2008). 
 11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1761 (2016). 
 12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1757 (1870). 
 13. The definition of “obligation naturelle” that Gérard Cornu prepared, as 
recast by the team of scholars and jurilinguists led by Professor Levasseur, is most 
helpful: 
As opposed to a civil obligation, a natural obligation is one the specific 
performance of which may not be had from a court, but one whose free 
and voluntary performance cannot be reclaimed, in as much as it is the 
fulfillment of a moral duty (gambling debt, duty of maintenance between 
brothers). 
GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE 389 (Alain A. Levasseur & 
Marie-Eugénie Laporte-Legeais et al. trans., 2014) (citations omitted). 
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this misfit14 thus seems to highlight the civil law’s disorder rather than the 
orderly grid of abstract rationality that, for so many, is thought of as the 
legal tradition’s fundamental construct.  
Confronting first-year law students with the natural obligation at the 
beginning of their education is, however, no accident. Beyond whatever 
value is to be had from knowing the technical contours of the natural 
obligation, the choice serves two special purposes that best justify why an 
apparent “anomaly”15 is the right place to start teaching obligations. First, 
identifying the natural obligation provides an opportunity to teach some of 
the fundamentals of civilian methodology. Second, because the natural 
obligation appears to rest on a twin divide—between natural law and 
positive law on one hand and between common law and civil law on the 
other—teaching this topic also offers an early chance to introduce 
problems of legal theory and comparative law that too often are shunted 
aside in a first-year curriculum. When embraced by teachers like Alain 
Levasseur, the natural obligation serves as a reminder that the law of 
obligations is a unique site for learning the civil law. 
I. CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS AND 
CHARACTERIZATION OF DUTIES  
The decision to start teaching obligations with this topic reflects a 
commitment to methodology that is part of the Louisiana civil law 
tradition. Emphasizing the natural obligation is designed to help forge, at 
the start of a student’s path in the law, his or her identity as a civilian by 
placing sources of law, techniques of classification of obligations, and 
characterization of duties and juridical facts at the core of learning. 
Teaching the natural obligation involves all of these: What are the sources 
of obligations? How can they be classified into coherent taxonomies? How 
are duties characterized so that they can be properly depicted as moral, 
natural, or civil obligations? The organization of Louisiana Law of 
Obligations: A Methodological & Comparative Perspective, along with 
                                                                                                             
 14. It is perhaps best to acknowledge, as David V. Snyder noted in a rich 
study of natural obligations in Louisiana law, that scholars are in part drawn to 
the topic because of the concept’s sui generis qualities. David V. Snyder, The 
Case of Natural Obligations, 56 LA. L. REV. 423, 424 (1995). 
 15. French authors Marcel Planiol and Georges Ripert used the word to 
describe the natural obligation in their Traité Pratique de Droit Civil Français, 
which Levasseur quotes in his translation. LEVASSEUR ET AL., supra note 6, at 24 
(citing 7 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT 
CIVIL FRANÇAIS 314, 316–18 (Paul Esmein rev., 2d ed. 1954)).  
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the questions asked at the end of each of the proposed readings, show these 
methodological concerns to be at the heart of the authors’ teaching 
project.16  
The opening pages devoted to the natural obligation in this student text 
bear on “Louisiana Sources of Law.” The authors give voice to their first-
order preoccupation with sources, specifically the necessity of setting the 
Civil Code apart from decided cases as part of an effort to highlight, from 
the early days of teaching, the hierarchy of sources of law and centrality 
of that enactment as a statement of Louisiana’s private law of general 
application.17 This focus is especially opportune in that reading decided 
cases will be held out, elsewhere in the curriculum, as the all-important 
moment for learning the law and cataloguing legal ideas. Moreover, as one 
scholar with experience teaching in Louisiana and other civil law 
jurisdictions has convincingly argued, the local jurisprudence itself—
perhaps because of a discursive style that reflects judicial method 
prevalent elsewhere in the United States—tends to deflect attention away 
from the Civil Code as a source of the law.18  
Teaching the natural obligation is thus, methodologically speaking, 
about introducing the sources of the law and presenting students with the 
special status of a civil code as the primary articulation of private law of 
general application in this field. As In re Atkins,19 the first case in the 
readings, makes plain, the Louisiana Civil Code—unlike the codes of 
France and Quebec—has provided the student with a list of natural 
obligations that may or may not be closed.20 The first part of Professor 
                                                                                                             
 16. See, e.g., LEVASSEUR ET AL., supra note 6, at 9. Levasseur provides a 
series of questions for the student-reader to consider, which emphasizes the 
primary role of legislation, as against judicial pronouncement, in “creating” 
Louisiana private law. Id. 
 17. The authors object, for example, to a judicial turn of phrase in one of the 
cases under study suggesting that the courts, not the code, establish what 
obligations are natural ones. See id. at 23.  
 18. Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus: The Place of the Civil Code in 
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 46 (2012) (“When 
reading cases, students do not get a strong impression that the law is to be found 
in the code. Few cases offer a clear and full analysis and interpretation of code 
provisions. Lip service is paid to the code, with the judgments sometimes 
checking that the code’s solution is not contradicted by the cases.”). 
 19. See In re Atkins’ Estate, 30 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1929). The case deals with 
a parent’s moral duty to treat children equally and how that duty is enforceable in 
Louisiana law. Id. 
 20. Article 1762—and before a reform of the law in 1984–85, article 1758 in 
the Code of 1870—contrasts with the Civil Code of Québec, for example, which 
has no such list and where the codal references to the natural obligation are, at 
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Levasseur’s pedagogical design is thus an invitation to his students to 
locate the place of enactment, as against decided cases, among the sources 
of the civil law of obligations and—beyond its account of positive law—
to understand that the Civil Code is itself a sort of classroom for learning 
the civil law.21 He uses the problem of whether the Civil Code establishes 
a numerus clausus of natural obligations to explode the myth of the Code 
as a complete account of the law. Further, Professor Levasseur encourages 
students to explore ideas related to the natural obligation in successions, 
donations, and enrichment without cause to develop codal dexterity and a 
general understanding of the Civil Code as a coherent expression of 
Louisiana’s “common law.” 
For the authors, this emphasis on methodology also includes an 
exercise in the ancient rite of “classification” of obligations, undertaken as 
part of the scholarly pursuit of organizing the law in the abstract.22 
Obligations may be “scientifically” grouped or classified, of course, 
according to their object, their intensity, their source, and even according 
to the differing sanctions that serve to distinguish natural, moral, and civil 
obligations.23 Classification is a renowned organizing technique for the 
civil law generally, and the law of obligations in particular, which civilians 
understand to be the locus of the most subtle exertions of this kind. These 
classifications establish taxonomies that structure legal ideas and, 
eventually, structure the minds of the jurists who work with them. Beyond 
any role that natural obligations might have in regulating conduct, 
understanding how and why the concept is to be grouped in a category 
alongside moral and civil obligations is a reminder that classification is a 
                                                                                                             
best, a fragmentary account of the law. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1762 (2016); LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 1758 (1870). On rare occasion, this difference between Quebec and 
Louisiana has been highlighted by scholars, as in the excellent conspectus on the 
law of natural obligations in DIDIER LLUELLES & BENOÎT MOORE, DROIT DES 
OBLIGATIONS para. 18 (2d ed. 2012). 
 21. Professor Levasseur thereby evoked the notion of a “pedagogical code,” 
an expression usefully coined by civilian law teacher and scholar Michael 
McAuley. Michael McAuley, The Pedagogical Code, 63 LA. L. REV. 1293, 1299 
(2003). McAuley linked the teaching vocation of a civil code to the vibrancy of 
the civil law tradition in Louisiana and elsewhere. Id. This Author expresses 
gratitude to Professor McAuley for discussions of several points in this Essay. 
 22. For a rich presentation of the organizational virtues of classification and 
characterization, with useful comparative commentary, see Michelle Cumyn, Les 
catégories, la classification et la qualification juridiques: réflexions sur la 
systématicité du droit, 52 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT [C. DE D.] 351 (2011).  
 23. See PHILIPPE JESTAZ, L’obligation et la sanction: à la recherche de 
l’obligation fondamentale, in MÉLANGES OFFERTS À PIERRE RAYNAUD 273 
(1985).  
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veritable structure of knowledge in the civil law, and perhaps that it even 
constitutes law itself.24 
Sometimes classifications of obligations are otherwise rather useless 
beyond their organizational role. In an age where the conceptual unity of the 
obligation is a dominant idea, for example, one wonders why Pothier’s notion 
that obligations should be classified according to their source—contract, 
quasi-contract, delict, quasi-delict, and the law—retains such currency. And 
although classifying obligations according to their intensity—obligations of 
means, result, and warranty—assists in lending order to the messy and 
conceptually weak field of civil liability, the taxonomy is generally 
recognized as one achieved ex post facto, thereby limiting its prescriptive 
value. Indeed, classification by intensity has no real ambition to solve 
problems in advance of an analysis of the facts in any given case. The 
purpose of the classification, as has been convincingly argued, is thus 
primarily pedagogical and organizational: “it provides no basis for 
reasoning in positive law.”25 
But classifying obligations according to their effects, with emphasis 
on when and how they are enforceable by the courts, has not only 
organizational importance but also carries considerable normative 
ambitions. Theoretically at least, an obligation can be classified according 
to its effect in advance of its performance or breach. Each of the civil, 
natural, and moral obligations has its own regime for enforcement, 
something that certainly cannot be said, at least in the modern law, for 
obligations divided up according to Pothier’s sources. The civil obligation 
is enforceable before the courts; the effects of natural and moral 
obligations are, so to speak, less compelling. Voluntary performance of 
the natural obligation is payment, which is not the case for the moral 
obligation. The debtor of a natural obligation can, by unilateral act, change 
an unenforceable obligation into one that is civilly binding.26 In a word, 
the classification of obligations according to their effects is a priori useful 
in that such classifications will tell the debtor in advance whether his or 
her performance is due and, once made, whether payment can be 
recovered. 
                                                                                                             
 24. For a brilliant exposition of this idea, see Geoffrey Samuel, Entre les mots 
et les choses: les raisonnements et les méthodes en tant que sources du droit, 47 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ [R.I.D.C.] 509 (1986).  
 25. CHRISTIAN ATIAS, ÉPISTÉMOLOGIE JURIDIQUE para. 309 (2002) (Author’s 
translation). Although one might assume, for example, that the professional duty 
owed to a client by a lawyer or a notary is one of means, the technical nature of 
the act performed might reveal, after the fact, that a better characterization of the 
obligation would be one of result. 
 26. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1761 (2016). 
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To classify obligations properly on this axis, however, one must learn 
to recognize the natural obligation as against its taxonomic partners. Once 
that division is made, in the minds of the student, between the perfect civil 
obligation, and the imperfect moral obligation, the range of circumstances 
in-between in which the natural obligation can arise must be identified. 
Indeed, the infinite variety and number of moral duties that might weigh 
on a person’s conscience still call for sorting out, in Louisiana and 
elsewhere. This all requires a distinct effort of characterization (in French, 
“qualification”).27 Characterizing obligations requires attention to context, 
just as in the parallel endeavor of characterizing contracts, where facts are 
never ignored.28 Indeed, this facet of civilian methodology, having what 
has often been described as aspects both practical and scientific, is best 
understood as a central feature of the civil law of obligations that one must 
both learn and practice.29 
This exercise in characterization of duty is generally said to begin with a 
distinction between the natural obligations flowing from pre-existing civil 
obligations that are no longer enforceable and those arising in circumstances 
where no pre-existing civil obligation exists.30 Examples of the first category 
include obligations that are extinguished by prescription, invalid for a defect 
of form, or unenforceable because of a more substantial vice, such as a 
contract made by an alert but incapable minor.31 The second category 
consists of purely moral obligations that, because of their compelling 
character, are elevated to the status of natural obligations. These 
obligations are notoriously hard to discern. Even of those types for which 
there may be some agreement—such as the natural obligation of aliment 
owed by collateral relations in the immediate family—their precise 
parameters are ever-changing.32 
                                                                                                             
 27. Professor Carbonnier has explained that characterization (“la qualification”) 
allows for facts to be organized and placed in legal categories. 1 JEAN CARBONNIER, 
DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION para. 23 (2004) (“To give a fact or an object the name 
assigned to it by law is to undertake its characterization.” (Author’s translation)).  
 28. On the rootedness of this civilian exercise in factual and theoretical 
concerns, see generally Alain A. Levasseur, Sale of a Thing or Letting and Hiring 
of Industry, 39 LA. L. REV. 705 (1979). 
 29. On how the “opération de qualification” is a difficult enterprise that takes 
years of practice, see ALAIN SÉRIAUX, LE DROIT: UNE INTRODUCTION 225–26 (1997). 
 30. QUEBEC CIVIL LAW para. 152 (John E.C. Brierley & R.A. Macdonald eds., 
1993). 
 31. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1762. 
 32. A natural obligation can emerge to fill a fresh gap in the law. An 
amendment to the Civil Code of Québec that abolished the civil alimentary 
obligation between grandparents and grandchildren, Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 
1997, c. 28, art. 585 (Can.), may well have given rise to the immediate advent of 
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Sorting out whether a given set of facts gives rise to a civil, natural, or 
moral obligation is thus something of a character-building exercise for 
first-year civilians.33 The readings that the authors of Louisiana Law of 
Obligations: A Methodological & Comparative Perspective set out 
suggest that this part of the project of teaching the natural obligation is, for 
them, a priority. Ultimately, given the limited application of the natural 
obligation, its pedagogical role in communicating some of the culture of 
the civil law to students justifies its place in the curriculum. One great 
scholar of the civil law has written that whatever its role as an instrument 
of social ordering, the law of obligations has a teaching function that 
serves to shape the mind of jurists and offer them skills and techniques 
they will deploy across the discipline.34 The time and energy the authors 
devote to the natural obligation in this Louisiana text is a case in point. 
II. NATURAL OBLIGATION AS A COMPASS 
In addition to providing students with an opportunity to encounter the 
categories and techniques used to organize private law—how the law is 
“mapped”35 as has been famously said—studying the natural obligation 
inevitably shows up some of the ethical orientation of the civil law of 
obligations. By presenting students a chance to chart the precise 
boundaries between non-binding duties of conscience and obligations that 
are enforceable before the courts, the natural obligation is itself something 
of a moral compass for the civilian jurist. To quote a celebrated Louisiana 
scholar, this study reveals not just law’s mechanical workings but also 
some of the “soul of [the] law.”36 The variance in how the natural 
obligation is welcomed across jurisdictions provides something of a 
                                                                                                             
a natural obligation to cover the moral duty between relatives in the direct line in 
the first degree. See LLUELLES & MOORE, supra note 20, at 28. 
 33. For a lively student perspective, written by a Louisiana “merry devil” 
under Shakespearean cover, see Launcelot Gobbo, Perfect, Imperfect, and 
Natural Obligations, 2 LOY. L.J. 41 (1920). 
 34. Paul-A. Crépeau, La fonction du droit des obligations, 43 MCGILL L.J. 
729 (1998). 
 35. Peter Birks, Equity and the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26 
U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (where the metaphor of the map, informed in 
part by classical civil law categories, is deployed by a scholar who might be the 
common law’s most famous cartographer since Blackstone). 
 36. Robert A. Pascal, Louisiana Civil Law and Its Study, 60 LA. L. REV. 1, 3–
7 (1999). Professor Pascal cited several institutions of the civil law that pointed 
to its moral orientation—principles of unjust enrichment, certain heightened 
family obligations—to which, in our view, the natural obligation might usefully 
be added. Id. 
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geographic orientation to the law as well. Often depicted as a characteristically 
civilian idea, the natural obligation is sometimes said not to exist in the 
common law, or at least not in a readily recognizable form.37 Both these 
moral and comparative dimensions of the topic further explain why the 
natural obligation is such a rich topic to begin teaching the law. 
As to the first of these considerations, the natural obligation certainly 
introduces a student to the classical jurisprudential challenge of distinguishing 
between the moral duties that stand outside the law and those obligations that 
the law chooses to recognize formally. In this sense, the cases and materials 
placed before the readers of Louisiana Law of Obligations: A 
Methodological & Comparative Perspective do more than set out the law 
in force. Through technical problems—such as whether a juridical person 
can feel a moral duty, whether unenforceable moral duties owed to family 
members can be “novated” by juridical act into civil obligations, and 
whether a gambling debt of uncertain ethical status can support a natural 
obligation—teachers can use the topic to raise fundamental issues as to the 
meaning of law and its right ambitions as matters of legal theory with their 
students. With the “molding” of the legal mind comes an early opportunity 
to adopt a critical stance in teaching natural obligations, based on the 
student’s own conception of what are the right parameters of moral and 
legal obligations.38  
In French legal education, the natural obligation is generally encountered 
by a student in his or her course on “Introduction to Law,” traditionally taught 
by private law scholars, often professors of the law of obligations. The 
unspoken idea is that studying law can be usefully introduced using private 
law as a sort of laboratory, given in particular the importance of the civil 
code in French legal culture, and its impact on imagining law more 
generally. In this setting, the natural obligation is not taught for its 
importance as a problem-solving technique but as a topic in legal theory, 
principally as a means of introducing the difference between natural law 
                                                                                                             
 37. The expert position is that the common law “rejected” the natural 
obligation, at least for the law of contract, on the strength of the idea that past 
consideration cannot be valid consideration. RENÉ DAVID & FRANÇOISE GRIVART 
DE KERSTRAT, LES CONTRATS EN DROIT ANGLAIS 135 (1973). Professor David 
explained that a person who undertakes to perform a natural obligation receives 
“nothing” in return at the time the undertaking is made. Id. The undertaking 
cannot therefore be said to rest on a valid consideration for the common law. Id. 
 38. The choice of the natural obligation as an early teaching topic is thus at 
once an occasion to “mold” and “unmold” the legal mind. On the phenomenon as a 
healthy approach to law teaching, see Ruth Sefton-Green, Introduction, in 
‘DÉMOULAGES’: DU CARCAN DE L’ENSEIGNEMENT DU DROIT VERS UNE ÉDUCATION 
JURIDIQUE 20–21(Sefton-Green ed., 2015).  
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and positive law as a basis for social ordering.39 Where an author’s 
sensibilities for natural law are particularly marked, the treatment of the 
natural obligation becomes an opportunity to challenge assumptions about 
the appropriate parameters of legal positivism.40 The influence of one 
particularly moralistic book—La règle morale dans les obligations 
civiles41—often quoted uncritically, seems to be ubiquitous in the modern 
literature. The favor with which Professor Ripert’s natural law explanation 
of the law of obligations is received suggests that, contrary to myth, 
France’s much vaunted commitment to state-centered legal positivism 
may be much weaker than the doctrinal exposition on less spiritual topics 
in obligations would have us understand. Other scholars are more cautious, 
seeing the natural obligation as a true middle ground, or at least a 
“synthesis between law and social values,”42 or endeavoring to set it apart 
from duties of “honor”43 or of “conscience.”44 But the key point is that the 
natural obligation is taught as a matter of what law is, not merely how 
obligations work. 
The texts of the Louisiana Civil Code seem almost undecided as to 
whether the natural obligation draws its juridical force from enactment or 
from a notionally higher authority. Some of the uncertainty can be linked 
to the challenging idea stated in article 1760, and left unexpressed in the 
French and Quebec enactments: “A natural obligation arises from 
circumstances in which the law implies a particular moral duty to render a 
performance.”45 The Civil Code thus describes the natural obligation so 
that it might properly be identified, but the normative source of the 
“particular moral duty” seems beyond legislative grasp. The definition in 
former article 1758, with its allusion to duties that are binding “according 
to natural justice,” was even bolder in its acknowledgment that the source 
of the natural obligation, ultimately, was to be traced to some super-
eminent, extra-codal principle. One is tempted to think that this aspect of 
                                                                                                             
 39. See, e.g., FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE AU DROIT 16 (7th 
ed. 2006) (discussing natural obligations).  
 40. For a particularly high-minded example of this scholarship, see SÉRIAUX, 
supra note 29, at 64–65. He describes natural obligations as “obligations which 
flow from natural law but that have not yet been positivized.” Id. (Author’s 
translation). 
 41. GEORGES RIPERT, LA RÈGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES 192 
(4th ed. 1949).  
 42. Maud Coudrais, L’obligation naturelle: une idée moderne?, REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDciv.], July–Sept. 2011, at 453. 
 43. BERNARD BEIGNIER, L’HONNEUR ET LE DROIT 528 (1995). 
 44. DOMINIQUE LASZLO-FENOUILLET, LA CONSCIENCE 150 (1993). 
 45. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1760 (2016). 
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the law, despite the repeal of the definition, is probably unchanged. In 
addition, the use of the word “implies” in current article 1760 suggests that 
the foundation of the natural obligation that the Civil Code recognizes may 
still be located, at least in part, outside the enactment. Alternatively—and 
less spiritually—the legislature may prefer to give courts a mere standard 
for identifying natural obligations rather than constraining them with a 
fixed rule.46 In any event, the legislature seems to hint at the interpretive 
ideal, associated with French authors Raymond Salleilles and François 
Gény, of an understanding of law “through the civil code, but beyond the 
civil code,” a notion that has been influential in Louisiana.47 
Fundamental issues as to the boundary between law and non-law may 
also be taken up through the concrete examples raised in the student 
textbook written by Alain Levasseur and his colleagues. One scholar 
helpfully described the natural obligation as a civil bond that is en 
sommeil, or asleep,48 such that a half-conscious debtor or creditor would 
place the natural obligation on a conceptual middle ground, from the point 
of view of legal sources, between law and non-binding moral imperative. 
This idea of the natural obligation in a middle space, associated with 
France’s great legal sociologist Jean Carbonnier,49 may be an instance of 
what Canadian comparatist H.P. Glenn called non-classical logic in legal 
reasoning.50 That idea is also echoed in the response of the law of 
obligations to new commercial arrangements that fail to fit adequately into 
existing categories. Agreements in commercial matters where the parties 
purport to bind themselves to one another, but somehow not in law, are a 
case in point. Sometimes, rather than being simply consigned to the non-
legal dustbin, the obligations flowing from these agreements are placed on 
the same uneasy middle ground of the natural obligation. The honor 
                                                                                                             
 46. On the balance between “rules” and “standards” in Louisiana’s fundamental 
law, see John A. Lovett, Love, Loyalty and the Louisiana Civil Code: Rules, Standards 
and Hybrid Discretion in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 72 LA. L. REV. 923 (2012). 
 47. For a Louisiana perspective in English, see John H. Tucker, Jr., Au-delà 
du Code Civil, Mais par le Code Civil, 34 LA. L. REV. 957 (1974) (supporting the 
recognition of a mineral servitude in the civil law). 
 48. Mario Rotondi, Quelques considérations sur le concept d’obligation 
naturelle et sur son évolution, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTDciv.], 
Jan.–Mar. 1979, at 1. 
 49. CARBONNIER, supra note 27, at 165. 
 50. H.P. Glenn, Choice of Law and Choice of Logic, in H.P. GLENN & LIONEL 
SMITH, LAW AND THE NEW LOGICS (forthcoming 2016). Professor Glenn argues 
for a recognition of the logic of the “middle ground” in the law that admits 
answers other than right and wrong and values other than true or false. This 
Author is grateful to Professor Smith for the discussion of this point and for 
providing a draft of this manuscript. 
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agreement—analyzed helpfully as an atypical obligation, but not 
completely “ajuridical”—shows, as does the natural obligation, the 
theoretical weaknesses of the all-or-nothing characterizations.51 However 
destabilizing these questions might be for the first-year student, the natural 
obligation plainly offers a happy opportunity for an early engagement with 
legal theory at the very start of legal studies. 
Alongside these fundamental questions of legal theory, the natural 
obligation holds a special promise, in a jurisdiction like Louisiana, where 
students will necessarily be confronted over time with the challenge of 
imagining law from the perspective of different legal traditions. The 
authors rightly seize on the peculiarly civilian character of the natural 
obligation to draw explicit links between Louisiana law and modern 
French law. Students are introduced to the scholarship of French authors 
who speak in a voice—conceptually and, thanks to careful civilian 
translation, lexically—that is wholly recognizable. The purpose is as plain 
as it is noble: Professor Levasseur and his colleagues seek to identify 
shared words and shared ideas to locate the Louisiana law of obligations 
within a continental legal tradition not necessarily beholden to Anglo-
American law. At the same time, they disabuse students of the idea that 
Louisiana law is necessarily a parochial or exclusively inward-looking 
legal order by inviting comparison with cognate jurisdictions. Finally, by 
insisting through the pages of their book on a rigorous use of civilian 
vocabulary in English, the authors gently show readers that the law’s 
language and its sources are linked. The insistence on using civilian 
English is properly understood as an encouragement for students to 
understand the tradition-specific influences on the law in the “mixed” legal 
jurisdiction in which they study.52 
Later in their careers—Louisiana jurists often have far-flung 
destinies—Alain Levasseur’s first-year students may wonder why so little 
is said about the natural obligation in the common law. Here, their 
professor’s “open window” to comparison, to invoke Vernon Palmer’s 
helpful idea for the intellectual opportunities offered to jurists working in 
                                                                                                             
 51. The debate in Quebec law as to whether a new category of ajuridical 
obligations exists alongside moral, civil, and natural obligations to accommodate 
honor pacts or “gentlemen’s agreements” is already rich and spirited. See JEAN-
LOUIS BAUDOUIN ET AL., LES OBLIGATIONS 41–42 (Yvon Blais ed., 6th ed. 2013); 
Jean-Guy Belley, Les ‘obligations ajuridiques: Les oubliés du Code civil?, in LES 
OUBLIÉS DU CODE CIVIL DU QUÉBEC 148–49 (Vincent Caron et al. eds., 2014). 
 52. Much of Alain Levasseur’s comparative law scholarship is devoted to this 
topic. For a rich overview, see Alain A. Levasseur & Vicenç Feliú, The English 
Fox in the Louisiana Civil Law Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the 
English Language; Comparativists Beware!, 69 LA. L. REV. 715 (2009).  
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a mixed jurisdiction, will prove invaluable.53 In a sense, a common lawyer 
without civilian sensibilities might entirely miss the natural obligation as 
manifested, for example, in the law of unjust enrichment and restitution.54 
Long ago, Lord Mansfield, a cosmopolitan judge with a culture in Scots law 
and Roman law,55 famously raised the natural obligation in Moses v. 
MacFerlan.56 Yet the natural obligation has faced steady resistance in 
common law circles over the years, explained by some critics as the failure 
to see the roots of the idea in natural justice that are so plain to a civilian.57 
One assumes that, wherever they practice law, students of the Louisiana law 
of obligations will not likely fall prey to that narrow view. 
One question remains as to how and when teachers and students should 
take the comparative turn for the natural obligation and the materials that 
follow in their course on obligations. Is it best to teach the natural obligation 
to civilians in a resolutely civilian mode, thereby allowing the genius of the 
civil law and its language to make its impression fully on the first-year 
student before, in some upper-year setting, he or she contends with the 
competing perspective in the common law? Is it pedagogically more 
defensible to teach the natural obligation in both traditions at once, in a 
“transsystemic”58 mode, where the common law and the civil law are 
integrated notwithstanding their differences in ideas, language, history, and 
                                                                                                             
 53. Writing in particular about comparative exchanges between jurists 
working in mixed jurisdictions, Professor Palmer evoked “a method which opens 
windows in the closed laboratories of comparative law.” Vernon Valentine 
Palmer, Salience and Unity in the Mixed Jurisdictions: The Papers of the World 
Congress, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003). 
 54. McInnes provides an excellent comparative analysis, presented as a 
means in which to show the common lawyer a civilian way forward. Mitchell 
McInnes, Natural Obligations and Unjust Enrichment, in EXPLORING PRIVATE 
LAW 175 (Elise Bant & Matthew Harding eds., 2010). 
 55. On his cosmopolitanism in law, see NORMAN S. POSER, LORD 
MANSFIELD: JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF REASON 42–43 (2013). 
 56. Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 680–81 (K.B.); 2 Burr 
1005, 1011–12. Lord Mansfield wrote that restitution is barred “for money paid 
by the plaintiff, which is claimed of him as payable in point of honor and honesty, 
although it could not have been recovered from him by any course of law.” Id. at 
680. He gave examples that, with hindsight, seem drawn from the not yet enacted 
Louisiana Civil Code.  
 57. See, e.g., Tang Hang Wu, Natural Obligations and the Common Law of 
Unjust Enrichment, 6 OXFORD U. COMMW. L.J. 133, 146–51 (2006). 
 58. For the perspective of a scholar who teaches civil law and common law 
obligations together, in an integrated manner, to first year-students in Quebec, see 
Rosalie Jukier, Where Law and Pedagogy Meet in the Transsystemic Contracts 
Classroom, 50 MCGILL L.J. 789 (2005). 
2016] KEEP CALM AND TEACH GAIUS 1123 
 
 
 
setting? Perhaps no single answer to these questions exists, even within the 
family of mixed jurisdictions, where varying social, linguistic, and cultural 
circumstances all have an impact on choices made in the classroom and at 
play in the curriculum in any given law faculty.59 What is plain, however, is 
that the topic of natural obligations has immense potential for comparative 
legal studies. 
CONCLUSION 
It may well be true to say that “Gaius has never really been lost from 
view,”60 but teaching the modern law of obligations from classical texts, 
along the lines suggested by the title of this paper, is not a realistic teaching 
plan for most.61 But starting one’s legal education with a study of the natural 
obligation, with reference to venerable civilian sources, may well have 
special pedagogical virtues. And although the experts may quibble as to 
whether this justifies teaching Gaius,62 the ancient traditions can plainly 
influence a civilian teaching style that remains effective today. 
Students, naturally enough, celebrate teachers who bring certainty to a 
curriculum that, on first encounter, seems so complex that it defies 
understanding. First-year law students crave clarity more than most, and one 
can well understand the professorial temptation to stay away from anomalies 
like the natural obligation. Yet good teachers are prepared to acknowledge 
that, here and there, the law itself is likely to be as chaotic as the messy 
world it purports to represent. They welcome the chance to teach the misfits 
on that basis. Alongside the spare rules in a pocket code designed to make 
things simple, the study of law should always leave room for an inquiry into 
the occasionally maladroit ways and means of legal knowledge. For the very 
                                                                                                             
 59. For a sign of the importance of civil law culture in the history of the law 
school at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center at Louisiana State University, see Paul 
R. Baier, 100 Years of LSU Law, 1906–2006: A Centennial Gloss, 67 LA. L. REV. 
289 (2007). Professor Baier, a constitutional law scholar who acknowledges the 
civil law’s imprint on his own work, provides an engaging historical sketch of the 
civil law at LSU Law. 
 60. Donald R. Kelley, Gaius Noster: Substructures of Western Social 
Thought, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 619, 619 (1979).  
 61. One is inclined nevertheless to celebrate teachers like Alain Levasseur 
whose own learning in the field extends to Roman sources. See ALAIN A. 
LEVASSEUR, COMPARATIVE LAW OF CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 
(2008) (commencing with quotations from Justinian and Gaius). 
 62. The Author makes no claim as to the proper attribution of origins of the 
natural obligation to Gaius or another, content to leave that matter to the experts. 
See, e.g., PHILLIP LOUIS LANDOLT, NATURALIS OBLIGATIO AND BARE SOCIAL 
DUTY 182–85 (2000).  
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best teachers—like the one feted in these pages—it is something of a duty 
that is binding in conscience and according to natural justice. 
